Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1994

Utah v. Rakes : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kris C. Leonard; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; Attorney for
Appellee.
Mary C. Corporon; Attorney for Appellant; Corporon & Williams.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Rakes, No. 940624 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6261

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

No. 940624-CA

vs.

District Ct. No. 941900597

JOE RAKES,

Category 2

Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH, PRESIDING

MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Appellant
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
310 South Main Street, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Telephone-.,
KRIS C. LEONARD #4902
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM #1231
Utah Attorney General
Attorney for Appellee
124 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

328-1162

IF
D
KF
50
J

FILED
NOV - 6 1995
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

No. 940624-CA

vs .

District Ct. No. 941900597

JOE RAKES,

Category 2

Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH, PRESIDING

MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Appellant
CORPORON St WILLIAMS, P.C.
310 South Main Street, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 328-1162
KRIS C. LEONARD #49 02
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM #12 31
Utah Attorney General
Attorney for Appellee
124 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

2

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES,
AND RULES, ETC

2

STANDARD OF REVIEW

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

7

ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SET
ASIDE DEFENDANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY BECAUSE THE
SAME WAS ENTERED INTO UNKNOWINGLY, UNINTELLIGENTLY,
AND INVOLUNTARILY

9

9

II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
REFUSING TO ALLOW DEFENDANT TO WITHDRAW HIS
GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE THERE WAS NOT A FACTUAL BASIS
FOR THE PLEA

15

III. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL WITH REGARD TO THE ENTRY OF HIS PLEA
IN THIS MATTER

17

CONCLUSION

20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S.459 (1969)
State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983)
ii

12
. .

11, 14, 15

State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1987)

10

State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293 (Utah 1992)

2

State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1390 (Utah 1987)

12

State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540 (Utah 1994)

3

State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983)

14

State v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)

3

State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1991)

3

State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994)

3

State v. Moritzsky. 771 P.2d 688 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

...

17

State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) . . . .

3, 17

State v. Stilling. 856 P.2d 666 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) . . .

2, 16

State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)

3

State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) . .

17, 19

State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) . . .

11, 13

State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)

...

13

17, 19

Willet v. Barnes. 842 P.2d 860 (Utah 1991)

3, 15, 16

Rules
Rule 11 (e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

....

9, 10, 13

Rule 2 6 (2) (a) , Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

1

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii)

2,5

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv)

2, 6, 13

Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6

4, 9

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f)

1

iii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

No. 940624-CA

vs.

:

District Ct. No. 941900597

JOE RAKES,

:

Category 2

Defendant/Appellant.

COMES

NOW

(hereinafter

the

Appellant

"Defendant"),

by

to
and

the

above-captioned

through

counsel, and

matter
hereby

submits the following as his brief of Appellant herein:
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court of Appeals pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f), and the provisions of Rule 26
(2) (a) of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Criminal
1

Procedure,

whereby

the

Defendant in a district court criminal action may take an appeal to
the Utah Court of Appeals from a final order for anything other
than a first degree or capital felony.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This

appeal

is

from

two

final

judgments

and

convictions

rendered by the Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge, Third District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

The judgments

and convictions were for Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8
(i) (a) (ii), and Attempted Distribution of a Controlled Substance,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8
(i) (a) (iv) . In particular, Defendant appeals the District Court's
denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES, AND RULES, ETC.
There
believed

is
by

no

case

law

Defendant

to

authority,
be

nor

wholly

statutory

dispositive

authority
or

wholly

determinative of the issues raised on appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Appellate courts

"review the ultimate decision to deny a

motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion
standard."" State v. Stilling, 856 P. 2d 666, 670
1993)

(Utah Ct. App.

(quoting State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 295

(Utah 1992).

The findings of fact of the trial court which lead to its ultimate
decision will not be set aside "unless they are clearly erroneous."
Id.

However,

compliance with

"the trial

court's

constitutional

ruling

regarding

and procedural
2

substantial

requirements

for

entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed for
correctness."

Id., citing Willet v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 861
::. •

(Utah 1992); State v. Hoff. 814 P.: -

• --i 1991).

Further, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that "ineffective
assistance of counsel falls on the end of the spectrum subject to
de

novo

review

defendant

has

o f c h e uiilinaLe
received

-ji

ineffective

violation of the Sixth Amendment."
1239

(Utah C t . A p p . 1 9 y b ) .

. i u u ul " /liei. h e r ciu'-1

.

assistance

•-

counsel

in

State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232,

U t a h t-upr-"ii^

.*i z ai i< i I It :ah Coi n t )f

Appeals decisions on the ineffective assistance of counsel issue
have shown no deference to whatever action the trial court took in
its application of the law

See State v. Lopez, 886 P.. 2d 1105,

1113 14 (Utah 1994); State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545-46 (Utah
19'; :

itate v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814

(Utah Ct. App. 1994);

State v. Harry, 8 73 P.2d 114 9, 115 1 (Utah Ct

App, 1994) .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, with
the crime of Unlawful Distribution of. a Controlled
Second

Degree

Felony,

as

well

as

Unlawful

.'ubstance, a

Possession

of

a

Controlled Substance with the Intent to Distribute, a Second Degree
Felony.

These charges were filed under case numbers 941900595FS

and 941900597FS, respectively,

Defendant was also charged with

other minor counts under these case numbers, as well as under case
numbers

941900594

and

9419 0 0 59 6.

consolidated into one case.

Th< ; t s e

< : ase

: were

On July :i 8, 1994, Defendant appeared

before the Honorable John A. Rokich, District Court Judge, and
3

entered a plea of guilty to the crimes of Attempted Possession of
a Controlled

Substance with the Intent to Distribute, a Third

Degree Felony; as well as Distribution of a Controlled Substance,
a Second Degree Felony.

On August 18, 1994, thirty-one days after

the entry of Defendant's pleas, Defendant's counsel filed a motion
to withdraw his pleas.

(R.O.A. 119). On September 21, 1994, the

court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
Denying Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas.

(R.O.A. 125) .

The trial court based its denial of Defendant's motion on its
findings that the motion to withdraw the pleas was outside the
thirty-day period set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6, Defendant
was sufficiently experienced in the justice system to understand
fully what

he was

doing when he entered

his pleas, and

Defendant had knowingly entered the guilty pleas.

that

Copies of the

motion for withdrawal and order denying the motion are attached
hereto, designated as Appendix "A" and Appendix "B", respectively.
Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of zero to
five years in the Utah State Prison for the third degree felony and
an indeterminate term of zero to fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison for the second degree felony.
sentences to run concurrently.

The trial court ordered these

A copy

of the Judgment, Sentence,

and Commitment Orders are attached hereto, designated as Appendix
"C" and "D", respectively.
Defendant filed a timely Notice of Appeal on October 11, 1994.
Defendant's

original

defense

counsel

was

Defendant was appointed conflict counsel.
4

then

discharged,

and

Defendant then filed a

Motion for Extension of Time in which to File Appeal Brief as well
i \ i Mot inn tu Romand for Determination of Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel

Defendant' s Motion {.or Remand wdu dei lied 1 :»> t .1 KE : I Jt .al I

Court of Appeals on July l '. >•>-:-'••. and again on September l, 1995.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant was prosecuted in Salt Lake County, SI .itv.-; <»! Utah,
for the crime of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with
Inte,

"

• •

• • •

'

iegree felony, on March 28, 1994.

(Amended Information, i; *•

Defendant was also pr osecuted

for driving under the influence and driving on a suspended license.
(Amended

Information,

brought

under

case

R 0 i\

number

66 )

Each of

941900597FS

prosecuted for Unlawful Distribution of. a
second

degree

941900595FS.
consolidated

felony

these

Defendant

. ..••

were

was

Controlled Substance,
under

(Information, R.O.A.

charges

case

number

j-se cases were later

Judith A. Jensen of the Salt Lake Legal Defender

Associat; i oi I entered an Appearai ice of Coi m s e ] on behalf of Defendant
on March 31, 1994.

(R.O.A. 1 1 and 72.)

The Defendant was bound over and arraigned in district court
HI M,JV l\

!QQ-l

(

76.)

Defendant entered not guilty

pleas on that date and the court scheduled a urial date.

(R.O.A.

15 and 76. )
OiI July 18, 1994, Defendant appeared before the Court for a
;

change of plea hearing
guilty

_

substance,

Av-t crime
, : i iai;-

of
!

••

:.o.A. 128.)
unlawful
• =1 i C o d e
5

Defendant entered a plea of

distribution
A,i n i

of

58-37-8

a

controlled

(l)(a)(ii),

a

second degree felony.

(R.O.A. 137.)

Defendant also entered a plea

of guilty to attempted possession of a controlled substance with
the intent to distribute, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8
(1) (a) (iv), a third degree felony.

(R.O.A. 138.)

The remaining

counts of driving under the influence and driving on a suspended
license, as well as all counts in the cases numbered 941900594,
941900596, and another circuit court case, were dismissed.

(R.O.A.

140.)
When Defendant entered these pleas, Defendant was under the
impression that he was not bound to his guilty pleas if he withdrew
the same within thirty days.

(R.O.A. 142 - 145.)

Defendant felt

that by entering the pleas he would have thirty days within which
to speak to potential witnesses about testifying at trial.
142.)

(R.O.A.

Defendant believed these witnesses would be able to testify

that the substance that was
methamphetamine.

in Defendant's possession was not

(R.O.A. 145, lines 1-17.)

Defendant also felt

that during this time period he would have an opportunity to obtain
a specific drug test on the evidence.

(R.O.A. 163.)

Defendant stated at his hearing to withdraw the pleas that the
substance

which

methamphetamine.

was

in

(R.O.A.

his

possession

163.)

Defendant

was

not

claimed

actually
that

the

substance he was arrested for distributing and possessing is white
powder which had been purchased legally at local gasoline stations.
(R.O.A.

144,

lines

3-7.)

It

is

a

legal

"over-the-counter"

substance to help persons stay awake.
In

addition,

Defendant

also
6

spoke

to Mr.

Crouch

at

the

pharmacology department at the University of Utah
lines 1 r) •••! 8 . )
a

false

Defendant learned rhar *~Np possibility of receiving

positive

test

<)ii

- M.-

methamphetamine is quite possible.
line^

-his f a i s e positive

IIMV

test as , . . ,is the test which is \\(R.O \ .
hrui

: :

(R.O.A. 148,

iries a-12.)

- :.

(R.O.A

114, lines 20-25, 145,

o ^ n r - :n both a police field
I IK.-' .-'Ldle rriun1 Idb.

:, .

Mr, Crouch informed Defendant that he

isrform a test: which would prove whether or not

there was a false positive result in this n 1.1. nal i cu

i K u ,'\ t 18,

lines 21-25 . )
' - -i :----

P e n d a n t ' s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas

was held

on. September

motion.

I- .

•*'•

12, 1994.

The Court

denied

Defendan*

;

" ho Defendant was sentenced on September

> serve .:

--.--t -rnuiate term in the Utah State Prison of

one to fifteen years for the second degree felony charge as well as
an indeterminate term of zero to five years for the third degree
felony rharge, i"<'» I >»-' served concurrent! };r,

(R.O.A. 160.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant
c o i 11 r o 1 1 e d

was

prosecuted

s i :i b s t: a n c e

a i id

for

unlawful

i i n ] awful

possession

substance with the intent to distribute.
later amended

distribution
a

a

controlled

The second charge was

to attempted unlawful possession

substance with the intent to distribute.

of

of

of a controlled

However, Defendant has

maintained that the substance which was in his possession was not
actually methamphetamine and was, in fact, a re-heated version of
ai I o ; 7 er the coi inter prodi ict si mi ] ar to "No-Doz" .
7

At the time Defendant entered his guilty pleas, Defendant was
under the impression that he would have the opportunity to withdraw
the guilty pleas within thirty days.

Defendant believed that

within that thirty day period he would have an opportunity to
contact witnesses to testify as to the true nature of the substance
which was in Defendant's possession, as well as to obtain a more
thorough drug test on the substance to prove that it was not
methamphetamine.
Further, the elements in the statement which Defendant signed
in court at the time he initially entered his plea to attempted
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute
were not correctly stated.

In particular, the form failed to list

the "knowing and intentional" elements of the crime.
(See

Affidavit

of

Defendant/Appellant,

attached

(R.O.A. 105.)
hereto

and

designated as Appendix "E".)
Additionally, Defendant timely requested that his attorney
from the Legal Defenders Association file a motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas.

(See Affidavit

of Defendant/Appellant,

hereto and designated as Appendix "E".)

attached

This motion was not filed

until thirty-one days after the entry of the plea, past the time
limit for filing a motion to withdraw the pleas.

The trial court

specifically listed this as one of the reasons for which the motion
to withdraw was denied.
The pleas were entered unadvisedly.
Defendant

ineffectively

in this matter.

unintelligently and involuntarily.
8

Defense counsel assisted
The plea was

entered

Therefore, pursuant to Rule 11

of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Defendant did not enter
his pleas with full knowledge and understanding of the nature and
elements of the offense, nor the relation of the law to the facts
of his case.

Accordingly, Defendant's pleas of guilty should be

withdrawn and this matter should be remanded for trial.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE
DEFENDANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY BECAUSE THE SAME WAS ENTERED
INTO UNKNOWINGLY, UNINTELLIGENTLY, AND INVOLUNTARILY.
Defendant entered guilty pleas to the crimes of distribution
of a controlled substance and attempted possession of a counterfeit
substance with the intent to distribute.
under

circumstances

such

These pleas were entered

that Defendant

was unable

to make a

reasoned decision regarding entering the pleas.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1982) states, in relevant part, as
follows:
(1)
(2)

In

A plea of guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior
to conviction.
(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with
leave of the court,
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no
contest is made by motion and shall be made
within 30 days after the entry of the plea.
addition,

Rule

11(e)

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Criminal

Procedure mandates in part:
The court . . . may not accept the
until the court has found:
(2)
(3)

the plea is voluntarily made;
the defendant knows of the

9

[guilty] plea

right

to

the

presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory
self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and
cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses,
the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses,
and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(4)
the defendant understands the nature and
elements of the offense to which the plea is entered,
that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt,
and that the plea is an admission of all those elements;
Utah R. Crime. P. 11(e).
According to the Utah Supreme Court,

M

[t]he rationale for

allowing a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is to permit him to
undo

a

plea

which

involuntarily made."

was

unknowingly,

unintelligently,

or

State v. Galleaos, 738 P. 2d 1040, 1041 (Utah

1987) .
The Utah Supreme Court has also stated that "[t]he entry of a
guilty plea involves the waiver of several important constitutional
rights,

including

the

privilege

against

compulsory

self-

incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, and the right to
confront witnesses.

Because the entry of such a plea constitutes

such a waiver, and because the prosecution will generally be unable
to show that it will suffer any significant prejudice if the plea
is withdrawn,

a presentence

motion

to withdraw

should, in general, be liberally granted."

a guilty

plea

Galleaos, at 1042.

In this matter the Defendant was under the false impression
that the entry of the guilty pleas could be easily withdrawn and
would also give him the opportunity to attempt to contact witnesses
to testify for him on his own behalf and to obtain a new chemical
10

analysis

on

the

substance.

Further,

informed him that he definitely

Defendant's

counsel

had

should enter the guilty pleas

because he would not have an opportunity to obtain witnesses to
testify in his behalf at trial.

Defendant's trial counsel did not

explain to him that a guilty plea could only be withdrawn for good
cause.

Defendant's trial counsel also did not explain to him that

he could have an opportunity to attempt to locate witnesses and to
obtain a more certain chemical analysis if he actually did proceed
with trial rather than enter the guilty pleas.
Defendant's lack of information and lack of communication from
trial counsel led him to believe that the entry of a guilty plea
would "buy him time" to investigate and prepare his defense for
trial.

Certainly this is a situation in which Defendant entered

into the plea unknowingly and unintelligently.
Further, the circumstances of this matter are such that the
Defendant entered the guilty plea uninformed.
legitimacy

or

truth of a guilty plea

"Concern for the

is an integral

ascertaining the voluntariness of that plea.

part of

Utah R. Crim. P. 11

(e) (2) requires the court to find that a guilty plea is voluntarily
made before it accepts it. A guilty plea cannot be voluntary if it
is uninformed."
1983).

State v. Breckenridae, 688 P. 2d 440, 444 (Utah

Additionally, this Court has stated that "[t]o withdraw a

guilty plea defendant must show good cause.
where the plea was entered involuntarily."

Good cause exists

State v. Thorup, 841

P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Defendant

believed

that

entry
11

of

the guilty pleas was a

procedure which could easily be overcome later.

He was under the

false impression that the pleas would be withdrawn as long as he
made a motion to do so within thirty days.

Defendant was unaware

of the good cause requirement for withdrawing guilty pleas.

It was

Defendant's distinct belief that, by entering the guilty pleas,
Defendant would have thirty additional days within which he would
have an opportunity to speak with and obtain witnesses to testify
on his behalf at trial concerning the true chemical nature of the
substance with which Defendant was charged.

Because Defendant's

trial counsel had told him that he could not obtain such witnesses,
Defendant believed that his only opportunity to establish a defense
for himself, through witnesses, would be to enter a guilty plea and
then use the "thirty-day period" he though he had to speak to
potential witnesses himself.
Because
involuntary.

Defendant

was

uninformed,

his

guilty

plea

was

Therefore, Defendant's plea should be withdrawn.

Moreover, Defendant's pleas were involuntary because he did
not

have

a

full understanding

particular facts of his case.

of

the law

in relation

to the

" [B]ecause a guilty plea is an

admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it
cannot

be

truly

voluntary

unless

the

defendant

understanding of the law in relation to the facts."

possesses

an

McCarthy v.

United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969) . See also State v. Gibbons, 740
P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987) .
The record as a whole in this matter does not indicate that
Defendant entered his pleas with full knowledge and understanding
12

of the consequences and with the full knowledge of the nature and
elements

of

the

offense

to which he was

entering

his pleas.

Specifically, the form which Defendant was given to read prior to
the pleas, and which he signed in open court regarding the second
degree felony was incorrect.
elements of the crime.

The form itself failed to list the

The elements of the crime, as stated in

Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv) , are that it is unlawful for any
person to knowingly

and

intentionally possess a controlled

or

counterfeit substance with intent to distribute, (emphasis added)
However,

in the

form which Defendant

signed,

"knowing and intentional" were not listed.
which

Defendant

entered

his

plea

was

the

elements of

Therefore, the crime to
not

properly

stated

to

Defendant.
Further, although Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure

creates

a

presumption

that

the

plea

was

entered

voluntarily, "the trial court's compliance with Rule 11 does not
foreclose the possibility that the court abused its discretion in
refusing Defendant's motion if his plea was in fact involuntary."
State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

In this

matter the trial court complied with the general requirements of
Rule 11.

But, as stated by this Court, "[m]ere general questions

which ask whether a plea is 'voluntary' are insufficient under Rule
11."

State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The trial court merely asked Defendant whether he had entered

the pleas voluntarily.

The trial court did not ask Defendant to

explain his position nor to explain, in his own words, what he
13

believed to be the crimes that he had committed and to which he was
pleading guilty.

Thus,

even if the trial

court had

strictly

complied with Rule 11 guidelines, the trial court nevertheless
abused its discretion because Defendant's pleas were, in fact,
involuntary.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that ""[t]he court has an
undoubted duty to guard against the possibility that an accused who
is innocent of the crime charged may be induced to plead guilty
without sufficient understanding of the nature of the charge or the
consequences of his plea.""

Breckenridge, at 443 (quoting State v.

Harris, 585 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah 1983) (holding conviction based on
guilty plea could not stand)).
Even
discussion

if

the

trial

regarding

court

did

the Defendant's

not

engage

in

a

specific

own understanding

of

the

consequences of entering the guilty pleas, the trial court was
certainly made aware of Defendant's mistaken beliefs at the hearing
on the motion to withdraw as well as at sentencing.

Defendant

specifically informed the trial court that he was innocent of the
charged crimes and that he wanted an opportunity to prove this at
trial.
which

Defendant explained to the trial court that the substance
he

possessed

was

not

methamphetamine

and

specifically

explained the purpose of such substance, the composition of the
substance, and that it was legally held, to the trial court.
Additionally, the trial court placed great reliance on the
fact that the Defendant had been involved in the criminal justice
system since 1974.

Such reliance was misplaced, however, because
14

Defendant's prior experiences in the criminal justice system had
involved petty actions. Most of the charges Defendant had faced in
the past had been dismissed.

Defendant clearly had not been faced

with a plea bargain in a felony matter prior to this case.

(R.O.A.

149 - 150.)
Certainly Defendant's situation in this matter is such that he
did

not

have

consequences.

a

clear understanding
Thus,

of

the

the trial court abused

charges

nor

their

its discretion in

refusing to allow Defendant to withdraw his pleas.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
ALLOW DEFENDANT TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE THERE
WAS NOT A FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE PLEA.
The trial court should have allowed Defendant to withdraw his
guilty plea in order to obtain a new drug test and to obtain
witnesses to testify on his behalf at trial.

There was not a

sufficient factual basis upon which to base Defendant's guilty
plea.
The Utah Supreme Court first enunciated the need for a factual
basis for the plea as a requirement for entry of guilty pleas in
State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1983).

The Court

"suggested that a valid guilty plea required a "record of facts"
showing either "that the charged crime was actually committed by
the defendant, or that the defendant has for some other legitimate
reason intelligently and voluntarily entered such a plea"". Willet
v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 862 (Utah 1992), quoting Breckenridge, 688
P.2d at 440.
15

The Willett court clarified the Breckenridae holding, "stating
that the record must reveal either facts that would support the
prosecution of a defendant at trial or facts that would suggest a
defendant faces a substantial risk of conviction at trial, "not
merely facts establishing the defendant's motivation for entering
the plea.""

State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 672 (Utah Ct. App.

1993), citing Willett, 842 P.2d at 862.
In the instant case, the facts simply do not support the
prosecution of Defendant at trial. Defendant maintained throughout
the process that he had not been in possession of methamphetamine,
that he had not distributed methamphetamine, and that he did not
possess methamphetamine with the intent to distribute.

Defendant

maintained, and specifically informed the trial court, that the
substance was merely a legal "over-the-counter" item which people
use

to help

them

stay

awake.

Because

the

substance was not

illegal, Defendant had not committed a crime.

Accordingly, there

is no factual basis with which to prosecute Defendant and there is
no substantial likelihood that Defendant would be convicted at
trial.
Further, there is no indication that the prosecution would be
prejudiced by allowing Defendant to withdraw his pleas.

Defendant

merely wanted the opportunity to speak to potential witnesses and
to obtain a more thorough chemical analysis of the substance in
order to prove that it was not methamphetamine, but was a legal
substance. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing
to allow Defendant to withdraw his guilty pleas.
16

III. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL WITH REGARD TO THE ENTRY OF HIS PLEA IN THIS
MATTER.
Defendant's

trial

counsel was

ineffective

in representing

Defendant's interests throughout the entry of Defendant's pleas and
with regard to Defendant's motion to withdraw the pleas. The Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is essential to protect the fundamental
right to a fair trial, the linchpin of our judicial system, and
thus "plays a crucial role in the adversarial system.""

State v.

Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), quoting Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984) .
The landmark case of Strickland v. Washington established a
firm two-pronged test which must be applied to the facts relevant
to the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.
courts have consistently followed this framework.

Utah appellate
"In order to

bring a successful ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must show
that trial counsel's performance was deficient in that it "fell
below

an

objective

standard

of

reasonableness,"

and

that

deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial."
v.

Perry,

899

P.2d

1232, 1239

(Utah Ct. App.

1995)

the

State

(quoting

Strickland at 687.
An ineffectiveness claim "succeeds only when no conceivable
legitimate

tactic

or

strategy

can be

surmised

actions."

State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468

from

counsel's

(Utah Ct. App.

1993) (citing State v. Moritzsky. 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) ) .
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In this matter Defendant's trial counsel failed to advise
Defendant as to the nature and elements of the crime to which
Defendant was pleading guilty. Defendant's trial counsel failed to
insure that the actual plea which Defendant signed in open court
was correctly stated.

Trial counsel failed to inform Defendant

that the entry of a guilty plea was a final disposition of the
matter and would only by withdrawn for good cause.

Trial counsel

further

plead

led Defendant

to believe

that he

should

guilty

because he would not be able to obtain witnesses to testify on his
behalf at trial.
Even

more

importantly,

however,

is

that

after

Defendant

entered the guilty pleas and determined that he wanted to withdraw
the same, trial counsel failed to file the motion to withdraw
within

the

statutory

thirty-day

specific timely request to counsel.

period,

despite

Defendant's

The trial court found this

failure to be jurisdictional and denied the withdrawal.
Further, at the hearing on Defendant's motion to withdraw the
guilty pleas, Defendant's trial counsel failed to argue the fact
that the crime of attempted possession of a controlled substance
with the intent to distribute had been incorrectly stated on the
form which Defendant reviewed and signed in open court.

Trial

counsel failed to inform the court that the form had failed to list
the elements of the crime.

Trial counsel failed to inform the

court that Defendant had been confused in his statement at the time
of the pleas.

The clear reason for trial counsel's failure to do

so is that counsel was in a conflict at that point, having been the
18

one to fill out the form in the first place.
Defendant's trial counsel also did not make any arguments
regarding her failure to inform Defendant as to the elements and
consequences of the pleas.

Defendant's trial counsel was in a

conflict of interest at the point at which Defendant indicated his
desire to withdraw his guilty pleas.
should

have

appointed.

withdrawn

and

At that point trial counsel

conflict

counsel

should

have

been

Instead, trial counsel attempted to handle Defendant's

motion to withdraw.

This created an even greater conflict of

interest and damaged Defendant's position even more.
This Court has stated that it "will not second-guess trial
counsel's

legitimate

choices might appear

strategic

choices,

in retrospect."

however

flawed

Tennyson at 465

Strickland, 455 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065).

(citing

However, trial

counsel's choices in this action were not legitimate
choices.

those

strategic

Trial counsel failed to withdraw from the case at the

point at which Defendant indicated that he wished to withdraw his
guilty pleas. Because the withdrawal of the pleas was based mainly
upon trial counsel's ineffectiveness, counsel's failure to withdraw
at that time only served to worsen Defendant's position.

Because

trial counsel did not withdraw at that time, the true reasons for
Defendant's withdrawal of his plea were not reported to the trial
court.

Moreover,

jurisdictional

there

deadline.

can

be

no

Accordingly,

strategy

in

Defendant

missing
was

a

denied

effective assistance of counsel in this matter and this case should
be remanded.
19

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial
court.

The Court should set aside Defendant's guilty pleas and

should remand this matter for trial on the merits.

Respectfully submitted this

day of November, 1995.

CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.

MARY C. CORPORON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT were mailed, first class, postage
prepaid, to:
KRIS C. LEONARD #4902
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Appellee
124 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
on this

day of November, 1995.

MARY C. CORPORON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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APPENDIX "A"

JUDITH A. JENSEN, #4603
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD" JUDICIAL/-DISTRICT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO WITHDRAW
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA

Plaintiff,
v.
JOE RAKES,

Case No. 941900595FS
JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH

Defendant.
COMES NOW the Defendant, JOE RAKES, by and through his
attorney of record, JUDITH A. JENSEN, and hereby moves the Court
to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that the plea was not
entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.
DATED this

/?

—

day of August, 1994.

(

<-^^>

fTH A. JENSEN/'
Attorney for Defendant

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt
Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111 this

//

day of Citt^/Qa^.

/

, 1994.

C0043

JUDITH A. JENSEN, #4603
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

!• nr

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD

ISTRICT,

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 0? UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO WITHDRAW
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA

Plaintiff,
v.
JOE RAKES,

Case No. 941900597FS
JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH

Defendant.
COMES NOW the Defendant, JOE RAKES, by and through his
attorney of record, JUDITH A. JENSEN, and hereby moves the Court
to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that the plea was not
entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.
DATED this

x

day of August, 1994

orney for Defendant

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt
Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 Ea^t 400 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111 this

day of

[lU4tSJ?f

U994.

C0119

APPENDIX "B"

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
ANN BOYDEN, 5043
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

Third Judicial District

SEP 2 \ 1994
By

\ \ ' •u?;^
I
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)
)

-vs-

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW
GUILTY PLEA

JOE RAKES,
)

CaseNo.941900597FS

Defendant.
Judge John A. Rokich

On August 18, 1994, the defendant, through counsel Judith A. Jensen, moved the court to
withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant had also entered a guilty plea in Case No. 941900595FS,
and defense counsel said in a telephone conversation that their intent was to move to withdraw
both pleas.
The matter was set for hearing on September 12, 1994. Defendant was present with
counsel Judith A. Jensen, and Ann Boyden was present for the State.
Defense counsel asked the court to continue the hearing to give defendant time to do his
own analysis of the controlled substance. The State responded that it objected to the motion to
withdraw the plea and that the drug analysis was irrelevant to that motion.

\j 01L* 5

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA
Case No. 941900597FS
Page 2

Also, the State had new concerns about further delay since the defendant was now out of
custody and two new felony charges had been filed against defendant since his entry of guilty
pleas in the above cases.
The defendant addressed the court personally concerning his guilty pleas.
The court then found that the motion to withdraw the pleas was outside the 30-day period
set forth in 77-13-6, U.C.A., and that the defendant was experienced sufficiently in the justice
system to understand fully what he was doing when he entered his pleas.
The court further found that the defendant had knowingly entered the guilty pleas and no
good cause had been shown to allow for their withdrawal.
The court therefore DENIED defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty pleas and
ORDERED the defendant to be sentenced on the matters on September 29, 1994 at 1:30 P.M.
DATED this

/{? day of September, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

JJL
Approved as to form:

A'A^JUL

JOH^ A. ROKICH, Judge
^""

Judith A. Jensen

C01T6

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA
Case No. 941900597FS
Page 3
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact,
Conclusions Of Law, And Order Denying Defendant's Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea was
delivered to Judith A. Jensen, Attorney for Defendant Joe Rakes, at 424 East 500 South, Suite
300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the "^ day of September, 1994.
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APPENDIX "C"

IN THE T H I R D JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,

v

vs.

•
r-UiC

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

0

/Lftkrt"-

Cf u

I

Case No.

,
\

Count No.
Honorable ,
Clerk
S/
Reporter
Bailiff
Date

Defendant.

'

ll

CCJI

/

^ / - ^ r
fCt
(V f2,h.ih^
< ^^
l-.-fh.
/''
PhUttnt

k^ti-

TfZjJZSM.

D The motion of
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is • granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; • the court; l^plea of guilty;
a plea of no contest; of the offense of
^ ^ tf** v / s^Vin
- ^ ^ 5 A 0/<T
t a felony
of the - 2 £ i i degree, D a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented by.
i^
, and the State being represented by /?. Hft'iijJ) i js now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D
£f
D
D
D
D
•

to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
;
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $
to

<£L such sentence is to run concurrently with < > i l. JM L(}p
D such sentence is to run consecutively with
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, • Court, Count(s)

ryi

fy/J^_

r

OL

/L/<?C<K>

£?5

are hereby dismissed.

D

D Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
• Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County • for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or a for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
£L Commitment shall issue
•pn
n±h /r.yM
DATED this

/ /

day of

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Defense Counsel

Deputy County Attorney

Page

j

of.

APPENDIX "D"

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMEN,)

Plaintiff,

Case No. .
Count No.
Honorable
Clerk
Reporter _
Bailiff
Date

vs.

rkr

&>k<L*;

Defendant.

cr^c) <

QQI^

•±S-

\<

SOiu-d-z,

£^.p r

D The motion of
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by a a jury; Q the court; 5? plea of guilty;
D plea of no, contest; of the offense of
rlfeLZ/f^M
~fl Q/Sl- A- &/£
, a felony
of the _J^!^legree f D a class
misdemeanor-being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented by <J , j f M fr
, and the State being represented by
(l.M&mp
JS now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
a
a
jSl
•
•
D
D

to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $.
to

PA
L^
Cd.^ ~rf=- ^u/q
oofJin
0-such sentence is to run concurrently with S^j{-hiL
D such sentence is to run consecutively with
are hereby dismissed.
• upon motion of • State, D Defense, • Court, Count(s)
D
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County • for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
R Commitment shall issue _

DATED this

'S-day of

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

^nh^r,19%jLc
DISTRICT COURT JJDGE

Defense Counsel

C0047

Deputy County Attorney
&

(White—Court)

(Green—Judge)

Page
(Yellow—Jail/Pnson/AP&P)

(Pink—Defense)

(Goldenrod—State)
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APPENDIX "E"

MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Defendant
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
310 South Main Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 328-1162

IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
Plaintiff/Appellee,
-vs-

Case No. 940624-CA

JOE RAKES,
De f endant/Appe11ant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:ss
)

I, JOE RAKES, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and
state as follows:
1.

I am the defendant to the above-entitled action and the

appellant herein.
2.

I was represented in the trial court in this matter by an

attorney for the Legal Defender Association.

I am now represented

by

the

a

new

attorney

not

in

conflict

with

Legal

Defender

Association.
3.

<7U&

I entered a plea of guilty in the trial court below.

Subsequently, I filed a motion to withdraw my plea of guilty.
4.

The elements in the statement I signed in court at the

time I initially entered my plea were not correctly stated, and the
crime to which I was entering a plea is not properly stated in that
form.
5.

I determined after I entered my plea in the trial court

that I wanted to withdraw my plea of guilty, and I requested my
attorney from the Legal Defenders Association to file a motion to
withdraw my plea. This motion was not actually filed by my counsel
until 31 days after the entry of the plea, past the time limit for
filing a motion to withdraw my plea.
6.

At the hearing in the trial court regarding my motion to

withdraw my plea of guilty, the attorney representing me from the
Legal Defenders Association, failed to argue to the court regarding
the confusion in my statement at the time of plea regarding the
elements of the offense, and the crime to which I was entering a
plea.
7.

I did not have effective assistance of counsel in the

trial court, because counsel failed properly to advise me at the
time I entered my plea of guilty, counsel failed to make a motion
to withdraw my plea of guilty in a timely manner, which the trial
court found to be jurisdictional, and my counsel failed to make the
arguments necessary at my motion to withdraw a plea of guilty,
because counsel was then already in a conflict of interest, in that

counsel should have argued that the plea was not properly entered
in the first place, due to the neglect of counsel.

(g&E RAKES

Defendant/Appellant
ON THE

V

J

day of

42L^ f

1995,

, tho^undersigned
tho^undi
personally appeared before me,
notary, JOE RAKES,
the signer of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT, who duly acknowledged to me
that he signed the same voluntarily and for its stated purpose.

NOTARY PU8UC
8TATE0FUWM

Notary Public

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon
& Williams, attorneys for the defendant herein, and that I caused
the foregoing Affidavit, to be served upon plaintiff by mailing,
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the same to:
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
on the ~^(

day of

l^^i

, 1995-

R
Secretary

